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30 October 1952

TO: 25, 25.4QA
FROM: 25.50/C
SUBJECT: UJ DREADFUL * PART II

1. Part I of this report was a summary of all UJ DREADFUL biographical data known to us. It was pointed out that the three facts which tend to confirm C I's analysis of his polygraph findings are the following:

A. UJ DREADFUL remained in the Okergrund-Bodenbach (CSR) area when the Red Army occupied this area, despite the fact that he had been an NSDAP party member, as well as a member of the SS and SD.

B. Arrested in May 1945, UJ DREADFUL was taken to Pirna and there released in October 1945. The release, he claims, resulted from cardiac impairment induced by auto-suggestion. He further claims to know nothing more about the location of his mother and two brothers, who were at home at the time of his arrest.

C. The year 1946 remains a conspicuous gap in UJ DREADFUL's curriculum vitae (he first joined ZIPPER in 1947). He claims to have been engaged in founding a wood-working business during this year.

2. The present (and concluding) section of the report consists of an analysis of UJ DREADFUL's operations in an attempt to determine the extent to which his operational record confirms or contradicts C I's analysis. This study of operations, it should be noted, could not be conclusive at best and is further weakened by the facts that FOB records are insufficiently detailed for the purpose and most of what we know about UJ DREADFUL's operations since he assumed his present position comes from himself. Nevertheless, the few operations which bear upon the point at issue and about which our information does not derive exclusively from subject are herewith presented.

3. The following episodes may be viewed as evidence tending to support C I's findings.

a. On 18 July 1951 UJ DREADFUL asked 25.50/C whether the latter could be of assistance in finding employment with Radio Free Europe for Reinhold FORSCHE, former administrative and clerical worker on the GV E staff. (FORSCHE was born 2 May 1897 either in Reichenberg or in Maffersdorf-Sud, CSR. A ZIPPER drop list of 28 June 1951 lists him as released on 30 March 1951 because his work as an administrative clerk was unsatisfactory. Colonel Goetz, in a memo of 26 June 1952, terms FORSCHE "unstable, erratic, and uncooperative toward Americans". A Berlin Documents Center check showed that FORSCHE had held NSDAP party number 6693894, and that he entered the party on 1 November 1938,

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a date which suggests that he, like UJ DREADFUL, had earlier been a member of the Sudetendeutsche Partei. (Field Comment: This supposition, and UJ DREADFUL's attempt to intercede in his behalf, suggest in turn that the two men knew each other in the Sudetengau and that UJ DREADFUL may have brought FORSCHE into ZIFFER.) UJ DREADFUL further stated that FORSCHE had already made application for RFE employment and that his sponsor in this matter was Professor Janos STICFAY-STITZ, who was already employed by RFE and who (UJ DREADFUL added) was known as an agent of the French IS. (Field Comment: Both MOLA-1586, 23 March 1950, and a CV G report of 20 May 1950 list STICFAY-STITZ as a French intelligence agent.)

(1) 25.50/C stated that he had no contact with RFE and that even if he could somehow find a way to recommend FORSCHE, he saw no reason why RFE should not regard FORSCHE's attempt to get work there as a penetration attempt by ZIFFER.

(2) UJ DREADFUL replied that if he were to attempt penetration; he would not do so through an ex-ZIFFERITE and that in any case he was in a position to obtain far better information about RFE than could be provided by a clerk like FORSCHE. (Field Comment: This info was forwarded to MCB in FM 82, 25 July 1951; FORSCHE was not recommended for employment.)

b. Stanislaw HAINZ (brother of Frantisek HAINZ, alias Dr. Josef URBAN of Operation SCHEMIA fame) was living in the CSR in 1947. He established contact (probably a smuggling arrangement) with three men living in Bavaria near the Czech border. These men are Karl FOITA, a border policeman named fnu MURRA, and fnu BRADACE. (Field Comment: FOB has no record of FOITA or MURRA-BRADACE, however, is undoubtedly identical with Emil BRADATSK, Passman-sreuth 81, who was a Bavarian border policeman in 1948 and who was also a Forscher (though not so listed to us by ZIFFER) for UJ DREADFUL. The latter point is established by the fact that it was Emil BRADATSK who brought together Walter GEIFFL (later a Residentura leader in CV E) and UJ DREADFUL. In 1947, through BRADATSK, HAINZ met UJ DREADFUL, who recruited him and gave him two minor assignments (a test run procuring Czech magazines and then a minor Sovzone task). In November 1947 UJ DREADFUL gave Stanislaw HAINZ his third assignment, which was to look up "the Chief of the secret detective office, Mr. (fnu) KALAUNER, in Praha-Strasnice. (Field Comment: All possible spelling variants checked, no record FOB). UJ DREADFUL stated that KALAUNER was highly reliable. (It should also be mentioned that in August 1947 UJ DREADFUL gave HAINZ a German Kennkarte made out under an alias.) Purpose of the HAINZ-KALAUNER meeting was to establish what had happened to an unidentified "female partisan member" who had worked for UJ DREADFUL, had made crossings near Domazlice, and was supposed to have been arrested by the STB during a crossing. HAINZ met KALAUNER in Prague. The latter stalled HAINZ, saying he wished HAINZ to carry some material back to UJ DREADFUL - material which first had to be assembled. Some days later the two men met at the Hotel Grav Petra Oszobozitele St., by appointment. KALAUNER, however, was accompanied by "four members of the State Security", who promptly arrested HAINZ while KALAUNER walked calmly away. HAINZ was taken to Bartolomjske ulice (Field Comment: an SNB jail), where he was interrogated and beaten repeatedly. After two days he was handed over to fnu RIPA of the Ministry of the Interior (i.e., STE). RIPA asked HAINZ to

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double; the latter "agreed", was released, and returned immediately to Passmanns-reuth, where he told the full story to UJ DREADFUL and Hermann WOLDFAR. The SNB interrogators had claimed to HAINZ, during his interrogation, that they already knew for whom he worked, how he had gotten a German Kennkarte, and where (on the German side of the border) that Kennkarte was hidden.

(1) The above story is part of an account written by Frantisek HAINZ in 1950 for MCE. Through a certain "Erich" MCE was then interested in recruiting Frantisek HAINZ, who (along with Stanislav) had by then been dropped by ZIPFER. (Field Comment: MCE did not pursue this intention further after receipt of traces.) It should be realized that Frantisek HAINZ was very bitter about ZIPFER generally and UJ DREADFUL particularly (he even wrote letters to President Truman) for cutting him off. His account of his brother's arrest, therefore, cannot be considered impartial. And even if URBAN was telling MCE the truth in 1950 (incidentally, he never states or implies that UJ DREADFUL betrayed his brother), the fact remains that neither Stanislav nor Frantisek HAINZ regarded UJ DREADFUL as responsible at the time of the arrest. Stanislav immediately came to Germany to tell UJ DREADFUL what had happened. Frantisek also crossed illegally, looking for his brother; he found him in UJ DREADFUL's company and himself promptly agreed to go to work for UJ DREADFUL. Both brothers then went back to the CSR and worked for UJ DREADFUL as agents-in-place until March 1948, when they were forced to flee.

(2) Had the Czech IS received its information about Stanislav's false Kennkarte from UJ DREADFUL, it would scarcely have revealed its knowledge-pointing straight to DREADFUL, to HAINZ and then sent him back to Germany. Nor would UJ DREADFUL have been likely to risk his (theoretical) penetration - he was then a UV leader - for the sake of small potatoes like Stanislav HAINZ.

(3) Likelier Hypotheses are (1) that Stanislav, an inexperienced agent, made gross errors which caused his own arrest and then twisted the facts to cover up; (2) that someone other than UJ DREADFUL (notably KALAUNER, who may have turned since DREADFUL knew him and may also have caused the STB arrest of the "female partisan") was the worm in the apple; (3) that Frantisek HAINZ, writing the story three years later and full of hatred for UJ DREADFUL, distorted the facts.

(4) Another possibility, however, is that UJ DREADFUL was indeed working for the Czech IS in 1947 and was the source of their information about Stanislav HAINZ but that he became so frightened by the Czechs bungling of the case (for if this hypothesis were correct, the Czechs were very stupid indeed) that it was at this point that he decided to play it straight with ZIPFER and with us.

c. There is one point of confirmation for the HAINZ brothers' story. The attachment to MP-91, dated 19 March 1952, mentions a fnu RIPA as a member of Dept. Z-1, Ministry of the Interior, and states that he is now in charge of the training of agents sent outside the CSR on positive missions. Moreover, a Leo RIPA, Cerchovska 4, Prague, attempted to recruit one Hans ULRICH in Regensburg by mail.

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d. Project 48 was a cumbersome, badly planned operation proposed by GV E in June 1949. It involved thirty-six agents, couriers, etc.; produced a few MGL's, none of much importance; and died for lack of courier routes. All persons in it, with one unimportant exception, were recruited either by Frantisek HAINZ or by Jaroslav KANTA, both now dropped. There is no evidence that UJ-DREADFUL recommended any potential sources to HAINZ or KANTA, or that he knew any of the sources. The only reported arrests were of a Czech couple not given V-numbers whose smuggling route was used briefly as a Project 48 channel and who were reportedly arrested for smuggling rather than IS activity. By February 1951 the project had been dropped. Working on the theory, however, that UJ-DREADFUL may have been working for the Czechs in the years 1949-1950, 25.50/C subjected all persons in the project to as close a scrutiny as our files allow. Of the 36 agents, couriers, etc., 8 were present or former SNB members (but so labelled by GV E); 8 were listed by GV F as Czech CP members; and 3 were found, by file checks, to be possibly i/w known Czech agents. These are as follows:

(1) Frantisek SLAMA (V-21019), retired SNB sergeant living in Prague, born about 1902, member of Czech Communist Party. A good friend of Jaroslav KANTA (chief agent for Project 48), who described him as tested and reliable. MGSA-1679, 2 June 1950, forwards WDGS report # R-190-49 re one Frantisek SLAMA, born in 1904 in Snehovice, a Czech intelligence agent who was "recently issued a Czech passport", valid in all European countries, by the Ministry of the Interior and who was assigned to Germany as an agent. MGSA-3554, 30 March 1951, also lists one Frantisek SLAMA as a suspected Czech agent. ZIFFER's SLAMA was to have serviced dead drops inside the CSR.

(2) Jaroslav BLAZEK (V-21011), born 10 April 1921 in Lihochovary, CSR, and living in Camp Valka in 1949, is 180 cm tall, has blue eyes and light brown hair. Traces turned up a Jaroslav BLAZEK, staff captain in the SNB or STB, who (at an unspecified time) was meeting STB agents working in Germany in the vicinity of ZEN and RUDU. This BLAZEK also has blue eyes and brown hair but was reportedly born about 1915. To confuse the picture further, a Soviet agent named Ilse-Maria KOLBE visited Camp Valka in the summer of 1951 and there learned to know Jaroslav BLAZEK termed by 40/R of ZIFFER as a Czech emigrant active for CIO in Valka.

(3) Henrich FIALA (V-214207) was born 14 April 1921 in Chotzen, Bezirk Hohermuth, CSR. In 1949, at least, he was living in Camp Valka. He is 172 cm tall, blond, with light blue eyes. On 24-26 August 1950 he reportedly attempted an illegal crossing into the CSR on behalf of Project 48 but failed to get over because of strengthened patrols. MGEW-5773, 3 May 1951, states that in July 1946 a fmu FIALA was recruited by a fmu HORNÍK of the (SNB) field office Tomicka. This FIALA was the trustee of a firm manufacturing textile needles in As, and he frequently crossed into the U.S. zone of Germany. He was soon dropped (in fact, before being actually recruited) for attempting to check up on HORNÍK at the same time that HORNÍK was checking on him. It is worth noting that Field Office Tomicka was run by FEIFAR and JFRABEK up to their desertion in Operation BOHEMIA.

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e. An exhaustive analysis of Project 49 was even more unrewarding. Project 50, however, turned up two potential sources who were of interest: Guido KRATOCHVIL (V-21217) and Jan REZNICEK (V-21204). KRATOCHVIL, a Czech general staff major, had been a friend of Karel TYR (one of the three key escapees in Operation BOHEMIA); REZNICEK, a staff captain had been a friend of both TYR and JERABEK. The two Bohemia figures proposed that the two men be recruited and/or induced to defect. Traces disclosed that both names appeared on a long list (about fifty names) of agents whom the Czechs intended to dispatch to the U.S. Zone of Germany. This list was compiled 6 March 1949 by the U. S. Military Attache in Prague. Without, of course, disclosing the source of our information, we passed the facts to ZIPFER. UJ DRFADFUL replied that it was inconceivable that the persons named were 1/w V-21217 and V-21204, because the Czech IS did not dispatch staff IS officers to the same target areas in which their own agents worked. Very recently, however, this thesis was greatly weakened. Karel PATZL, key figure in UJ DRFADFUL's Operation PHOSPHOR, was arrested by the SNB immediately on attempting illegal entry and was (thought the Czech IS) turned. While held by the STB Prague, he met and was queried by an unidentified man (possibly one Karel DUFEK) whom ZIPFER believes to be in charge of all Czech IS activities in Western Germany. DUFEK and PATZL had last met in Camp Valka/

It should be noted, however, that even if the KRATOCHVIL and REZNICEK of Project 150 are Czech agents, their known ties were to TYR and JERABEK, whose pro-Western loyalties were demonstrated by BOHEMIA, rather than to UJ DRFADFUL.

4. The following cases may be viewed as evidence conflicting with []'s findings.

a. Operation BOHEMIA:

In the late fall of 1947 one Ferdinand PODNECKY fled from the CSR to Germany, bringing with him his first friend, Jaroslava CAPKOVA. Org. 120 (later CV E) established that CAPKOVA was the sister-in-law of Vojtech JERABEK, a Czech IS captain. After working briefly for Org. 120, CAPKOVA and her boyfriend were dropped. In July 1948 CAPKOVA chanced to meet an (unidentified) Org. 120 source, known as such to her, and asked whether he could get a letter to her parents in the CSR. It chanced that Frantisek HAINZ, who had been recruited by UJ DRFADFUL about November 1947, was going on a Czech commitment on 15 July 1949. It was decided to have CAPKOVA add to her letter an endorsement of the bearer. This letter was then presented by HAINZ to CAPKOVA's family, who in turn introduced HAINZ to JERABEK. The latter agreed to defect and discussed his intention with Staff Captain Otakar FEIFAR, his friend and immediate superior (FEIFAR was then C.O. of Field Office Tomicka, 2nd section, 1st Military District, with headquarters in Karlsbad.) FEIFAR not only agreed to come out with JERABEK, but also persuaded a friend of his to accompany them. The friend was general staff major Karel TYR, 2nd section of the general staff in Prague. TYR decided to bring some file material with him, and JERABEK and FEIFAR decided to bring out the entire files of Field Office Tomicka.

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(1) By the time these plans had firmed up, HAINZ was working not under UJ DREADFUL directly but under FIFF, leader of Residentura (later UV) 108. Residentura 108, however, was directly subordinate to BV S, headed by UJ DREADFUL. FOB files show quite clearly that DREADFUL was informed about Operation BOHEMIA in detail from beginning to end.

(2) There is no doubt that Operation BOHEMIA was an important success for the West. When the three Czech officers came into the U.S. Zone of Germany on 8 November 1948, they brought the files mentioned above, various S/W chemicals etc., information about a W/T net, then being built by the II Section (the first monitoring of this net, conducted 10 November 1948, was successful) and - most important - a list of Czech IS agents operating in Western Germany. Arrests followed immediately; a Herald Tribune article placed the number of arrestees at "more than twenty". Frantisek HAINZ, writing in 1950, placed the number of those arrested and tried at forty-eight. (Field Comment: Not necessarily a discrepancy; the "more than twenty" were arrested 9 November 1948; the trials took place in February 1949; and the first arrestees undoubtedly further leads during the three months' interval.)

(3) Operation BOHEMIA, therefore, leads to the following hypotheses about UJ DREADFUL:

(a) He was recruited by the Czech IS or another Eastern IS before his arrest in May 1945, but had undergone a change of heart before July 1947.

(b) He was recruited in 1946 but underwent a change of heart. (The polygraph test suggests that he was not recruited during his May-October 1945 imprisonment.)

(c) He was recruited after going to work for ZIFFER (unknown date in 1947) but changed his mind before July 1947.

(d) He was recruited after 1 November 1948, the latest date at which he could have warned the Czechs about Bohemia.

(e) He was recruited by the Soviets at any time and reported Operation Bohemia plans to his contact, but the Soviets decided, to sacrifice Czech interests for their own. (It should be pointed out, however, that the failure of Operation Bohemia would not have cost UJ DREADFUL his job or even have hurt his chances for advancement.)

(f) He was not recruited by any Eastern Service despite polygraph findings to the contrary.

b. Defection of General Bohumir FODLEZL:

(1) General FODLEZL escaped from the CSR to Germany on 21 November 1949. Frantisek HAINZ played a large part in his escape. Although nothing in FOB files proved that UJ DREADFUL knew of plans for FODLEZL before his flight, the undersigned regards as safe the assumption that he did know.

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(2) RODIEZL seems to have brought nothing with him. He was, moreover, a retired artillery general who had been arrested by the STB on 20 April 1949. (He escaped.) Nevertheless, unless one is prepared to entertain seriously the suspicion that he too is a Czech agent, his escape must be listed on the credit side of the UJ DREADFUL ledger.

c. Operation PANSY and Frantisek KLIMOVICH.

(1) In MGJA-881, 7 December 1950, [] of JOB proposed that a "penetration" of the Munich headquarters of Gen. Lev. PRCHALA (i.e. of Vladimir FEKELSKY, PRCHALA deputy for Western Germany) be slanted as a penetration through FEKELSKY into ZIFFER. A [] objection was denied by [], at whose request [] then wrote MGLA-4541, agreeing in principle but adding a word of caution about the necessity for discretion. Shortly thereafter, in MGLA-4651, 5 January 1951, [] warned JOB that UJ DREADFUL had extensive knowledge of OKAPI personnel.

(2) On 9 February 1951 a note from 40/III/Z stated that UJ DREADFUL would like traces on a Dr. Bohumil BRQM, with whom DREADFUL planned to establish contact. JOB did not then know that Dr. Bohumil BRQM was OKAPI-28, the penetration agent of Operation PANSY. (COS Karlsruhe gave us this information on 11 April 1951, in response to our request for traces on BRQM).

(3) On a trip made by 25.50/c and UJ DREADFUL on or about 21 April 1951 (with no other Zipperite in the card), 25.50/c took the opportunity to ask UJ DREADFUL about his plans for Dr. Bohumil BRQM. DREADFUL replied that he had abandoned his intention to use BRQM for three chief reasons:

(a) BRQM was already working for the AIS and had attempted (on behalf of the IAS or the Czech IS) a penetration of the FEKELSKY intelligence organization.

(b) BRQM was a criminal who had attempted to poison Marie BLASCHTOWITZ-KOVA.

(c) BRQM was associated with Frantisek KLIMOVIC, and UJ DREADFUL suspected that KLIMOVIC was a Czech agent. He therefore suspected that BRQM and KLIMOVIC were probably double agents.

(4) On 2 April 1951, when 25.50/c sent out trace requests on BRQM, he had also sent a trace request on both BRQM and KLIMOVIC to Vienna. On 26 April 1951, COS Vienna replied that it had been in touch with KLIMOVIC from December 1950 to 21 March 1951: that KLIMOVIC was then revealed to be a peddler of a known fabricator ([]); that before COS Viena dropped him, KLIMOVIC had tried to sell various IS leads and that among these leads was an alleged sister of Dr. Bohumil BRQM who (the sister) was the secretary of the Egyptian Ambassador to Prague. Moreover, COS Viena confirmed UJ DREADFUL's story that up to early 1949 KLIMOVIC had worked in an IS group run by a firm "DONOVAN" or firm "TRENT" of the French IS. Also included in the group was a Professor Dr. Frantisek SIGUT, Vienna editor of the Free Czech Information Service, who was (said COS Viena) "highly suspected of collaborating with the RIS" (as [] had also warned us earlier). Finally, in an F-6 report originating with [], Vienna informed us that BRQM and SIGUT were selling weapons to the Chinese Nationalists while maintaining a tie to Vladimir CLEFENTIS-

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i.e., that they were working both sides of the street. (It is interesting to note that the [] report was also submitted to the word for word by UJ DREADFUL; this fact was pointed out to Vienna in MGLA-6441.)

(5) At the request of 25.50/c (who covered by voicing concern that such characters as BROWN and KLIMOVIC might have AIS ties, as UJ DREADFUL had surmised) DREADFUL submitted on 30 April 1951, and outside ZIPPER channels, a full report on SIGUT, BROWN, KLIMOVIC, and others in their circle, reasserting his suspicion that they worked for a Czech or other Eastern IS as well as the AIS, and submitting such evidence as he had at hand to support the charge.

(6) MGLA 13123, 1 December 1951, makes it clear that the BROWN of Operation PANSY is indeed a homosexual and presents further details on the DONOVAN/TRENT ring in Vienna. One member of the ring was fnu HOLY, a BROWN contact, "who is now a Czech IS agent".

(7) Proof of UJ DREADFUL's suspicions appears in the attachment to MGLA-5843, 27 March 1951. This attachment was written by Jaroslav LOUKACH or LUYASZ, sub-source a-8 of V-11213 (Sergei KIDAK), who in turn was working for V-11126 (Guenther GOLLY) in Project 73. At the end of February 1948 LOUKACH fled from the CSR to Vienna, where, through an old friend named J. ZVONIKOV, he was introduced into the BROWN-KLIMOVIC-SIGUT circle, which LOUKACH thought was a PRCHALA group. LOUKACH thereupon introduced to the group one Otto WICHLEIN, known to him from Bratislava days. In October 1948 WICHLEIN, by a ruse, persuaded LOUKACH to accompany him inside the CSR, where they were met by a captain fnu TIHY, Ministry of the Interior, Bratislava. TIHY and WICHLEIN "doubled" LOUKACH, who reported to his superiors in Vienna upon his return. LOUKACH notes, "During the time I was working, WICHLEIN called at ZVONIKOV's several times and carried SIGUT's and KLIMOVIC's letters from Austria to CSR."

(8) The point of the above story is that UJ DREADFUL volunteered to 25.50/c his suspicions about two Czech agents who were also deep inside the AIS at a time when 25.50/c knew nothing about these men and that a check on the story then disclosed that these suspicions were very well-founded.

d. Karel PATZL (V-21626) was the key figure in Operation PHOSPHOR of UJ DREADFUL and was the first of the two DREADFUL agents carried this summer and fall. His case proves nothing for or against UJ DREADFUL, and is therefore not summarized. After [], however, had tested PATZL on the polygraph, he made certain flat assertions which are herewith quoted... "PATZL hysterisch veranlagt ist" (PATZL has hysteric tendencies). "Er...zeigt auch sado-masochistische Triebe die hoechstwahrscheinlich auf eine starke und tiefe Neurose oder Psychopathische Veranlagung Zureckzufuehren sind." (He...also evidences sadistic-masochistic drives which very probably can be traced back to a strong and deep neurosis or a psychopathic tendency.) "Gutachten ueber den Vernommene: Eine psychopathische Persoenlichkeit" (Judgement of the person interrogated: a psychopathic personality.) In MGLA-C0972, 13 October 1952, [] also states,

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"Subject appears to be a psychopathological personality."

(1) At L J request, PATZL was also examined by Lt. Col. Alva E. Miller, EUGEN Theater psychiatric consultant, to determine whether PATZL could distinguish between truth and falsehood.

(2) The following quotations are taken from Miller's subsequent report: "There is no question that he (PATZL) is of superior intelligence — has an I.Q. estimated at 135...apparently his sex development is that of a normal adult of his age...From the psychiatric standpoint the subject is a highly intelligent, calm, self-reliant, confident individual who is...most mature in his thinking...There is no history or evidence of emotional instability...has marked emotional stability."

(3) The above analyses are quoted not to discredit L J as a polygraph operator (in any case his polygraph findings on UJ DREADFUL were confirmed by two other leading technicians) but to point out that L J tends to wander into the complicated and specialized field of psychiatry in interpreting his findings and that when he does so, he is a layman. The undersigned feels, for example, that his assessment of the personality of UJ DREADFUL (apart, again, from the findings of the polygraph) are rather wide of the mark (though not so extremely far off as his assessment of PATZL).

e. 25.40/A is far more familiar with the case of Alexander BOLF than is the undersigned. It is therefore suggested that if 25.40A feels that the BOLF case proves or suggests anything pertinent to the issue, he add his findings to this report.

5. Conclusions:

a. This study in its entirety (Parts I and II) proves nothing. It is nevertheless useful because (1) it shows us how much we do not know about UJ DREADFUL (gaps, which, we must hope, can be filled at least partially by ZIPFER) and (2) it allows us to estimate probabilities.

b. 25.50/c believes that both ends of the probability spectrum can be considered very unlikely. That is, UJ DREADFUL is neither completely above-board with us, nor is he now an active, reporting communist agent who has been so employed since he began work for ZIPFER.

(1) UJ DREADFUL cannot be pure as some. L J states that the lie reactions to all key questions were specific and unmistakable. His findings are confirmed by two other experts. If UJ DREADFUL is not concealing a past or present tie with an Eastern IS, then the polygraph, even in the hands of a skilled operator, is an exceedingly unreliable instrument. (We have requested an assessment of its accuracy.)

(2) At the other extreme, it is equally unlikely that UJ DREADFUL is a pro-communist agent who has been actively reporting throughout his ZIPFER career. Such a theory is tenable only if he were not working for the Czech IS, and if the IS (presumably Soviet) employing him kept his reports secret from the Czechs. Inasmuch as Czech reports on Western Germany are undoubtedly funneled into the USSR, like those of all other satellite states, the Bohemia operation represented a blow to Moscow as well as Prague. Moreover, if TYR,

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JFRAHEK, and FEIFAB had not come out of the CSR, UJ DREADFUL's ZIFFER position would not have been impaired.

c. Another theory which 25.50/C regards as unlikely is the "long-range sleeper hypothesis", the theory that UJ DREADFUL is actually a long-range agent instructed to play it safe, to make no contacts, to stay in place until notified. The five years of his ZIFFER employment are the five years of the greatest international tension in history and therefore the period when valid intelligence has an extraordinary value. For what crisis or set of circumstances could his Eastern masters be saving him? Certainly not as an early warning source, and if the plan is to hold him in reserve until war comes and thus insure a source inside the enemy's IS, it is remarkably ill-conceived, since neither UJ DREADFUL nor his superiors could be sure when he'd be a month after war began, or whether contact would be at all possible.

d. The theory, therefore, which seems to 25.50/c to come closest to fitting the facts is the following:

(1) UJ DREADFUL was recruited by an Eastern IS either before the war or (more probably) in 1946. He was probably instructed in his assignment - to penetrate the IAS or a related service.

(2) The November 1947 commitment of Stanislav HAINZ was the first commitment of a UJ DREADFUL agent. DREADFUL passed the word through his contact and also sent HAINZ to an STB man. The arrest of HAINZ, the disclosure to him of KALAUNER's true role and the STB knowledge of the Kennkarte, and the clumsy return of HAINZ as a supposedly doubled agent so frightened DREADFUL that he decided to pull out and play straight from that point on.

e. 25.50/c is by no means sure that the above hypothesis is correct; it is asserted only that this hypothesis comes closest to fitting the known facts. The amount of fact at our disposal, however, is not sufficient to enable us to form a theory solid enough to constitute a basis for action.

6. Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that the essential facts in this case be given to UTILITY as soon as possible. (One exception: no mention be made of the case of Frantisek KLIMOVIC and Bohumil BROWN, since UJ DREADFUL gave us this information outside channels.)

b. It is recommended that 25 and UTILITY decide upon the most practicable method of assembling all pertinent facts known to ZIFFER about UJ DREADFUL while restricting knowledge of this operation to one man.

c. It is anticipated that this study, though it should be more complete than ours, will not resolve the question of innocence or guilt. If not, it is recommended that one member of the proposed UJ DROSKY team be trained as soon as possible and that UJ DREADFUL be among the very first to be carried as part of a supposedly routine ZIFFER security program.



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d. It is recommended that if this second polygraph test confirms []'s findings (and a second test, once a basis for doubt arises, could be conducted for hours or days if necessary), the disposal problem be settled by the Germans. It is properly their problem in any case, and bringing them into the act as soon as possible will reinforce this point. Obviously, we shall have a voice in disposal, since AIS security is involved; but the basic decision is theirs.

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25.50/C

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